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Abstract
The invasion of Hallyu (or the Korean Wave) subculture in Indonesia created a new pattern 
of gendered cultural consumption in the largest Islam country in the world. The most ardent 
Hallyu supporters in Indonesia are women who are organizing massive urban fan gatherings, 
K-pop concerts, and group tours to Seoul. With a long and devastating record of state violence 
on Marxists, Chinese, and women in general, current public tolerance to Hallyu by the 
Indonesian government seems flimsy as female Hallyu fandom is threatening the mainstream 
Islamic value of feminine subservience. Although the strength of the local culture vis-à-vis 
Islam in Indonesia allowed an easy invasion of Hallyu into the country, the gender divide in 
the consumption of Hallyu is providing the Islam leaders with an easy excuse for possible state 
violence against women. Unlike Islamic, Western, and Japanese culture that are widely popular 
in the country, Hallyu’s salient feminine following invites jealous and alarmed reactions from 
Indonesian Muslim males. As the Japanese and Chinese anti-Hallyu sentiments among the 
male population led to massive outbreaks of anti-Korean hate speeches and demonstrations 
against the Korean residents and Hallyu promoters in the two countries, this paper analyzes 
how the female fans in Indonesia and Palestine are reacting to such threats.
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INTRODUCTION
Few people have imagined that South Korean (hereafter, Korea or Korean) 
culture would ever attract non-Koreans. Even fewer people have envisaged that 
Korean popular culture would mesmerize Muslim youths in such faraway places as 
Turkey, Palestine, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt. Since the rapid spread 
of Korean popular culture or Hallyu throughout the world through the Internet 
and electronic devices, including personal computers, laptop computers, and 
smart phones, Hallyu is now a common cultural decorum among the youths in 
Islam nations, including Indonesia, the largest Muslim country in the world.2 Of 
course, the popularity of Hallyu among the Muslim youths does not mean that 
Korean pop culture has replaced Islam as the mainstream cultural content in each 
Islam nation. Even during the unprecedented peak in its attractiveness among non-
Koreans, Hallyu was a mere subculture phenomenon among minority groups in 
their society (see inter alia, Hübinette; Hwang; Oh and Lee; Otmazgin and Lyan).
For the seemingly impossible global pop culture phenomenon in the early 21st 
century, wherein unlikely countries like Korea sell its pop culture content en masse 
to the fans all over the world, critics and pundits of popular culture began pouring 
out their polemics either in support or in disdain of the new pattern of cultural 
consumption among the youths within Islam nations. Particularly powerful, 
yet misleading, is the very view by some that Hallyu is a cultural invasion into 
economically backward areas of the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Huang). To 
many, this is a gross misunderstanding of the new global pop culture phenomenon 
(for example, Iwabuchi). Portraying the Korean cultural export to Islam and 
other nations as an invasion is a deliberate attempt to discourage and vilify third 
world (or formerly third world) cultural movements and their industries that 
attempt to preserve its local culture from Hollywood, European, and the Japanese 
entertainment industries. Pundits who argue that Japanese dramas and American 
Sci-Fi movies are far better in quality than the Korean counterparts are the very 
imperialists who want to defend the niche of the Japanese and American cultural 
industries that want to dominate every corner of the world, including poor regions 
of Asia (Iwabuchi). Furthermore, no one would accept a similarly mindless 
argument that the phenomenal success of the reggae and hip-hop music in the U.S. 
and Europe is a cultural invasion by Jamaicans. Third World music only enriches 
local pop culture content, just as black music had done for American white culture 
(Floyd).
The popularity of Hallyu among the Islamic youths, especially among young 
women, poses many new questions about Korean pop culture. First and foremost, 
their choice to consume Hallyu in Indonesia and non-Arabic Islam countries is 
not because of the Korean cultural invasion into their nations (in a similar fashion 
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to the invasion of Islam and Christianity) but because of their voluntary embrace 
of an exotic pop culture that they actively wanted to promote in their own region 
through informal digital means (e.g., YouTube, Facebook, internet fan sites, etc.). 
They actively promoted Hallyu in their own countries because Korea was a rare 
success case of development from the ashes of war and/or colonial oppressions 
(as evidenced by the interviews with Indonesian and Palestinian fans presented in 
this paper). Simultaneously, Korea has been one of the most pro-Islam countries in 
the world, as its economy has heavily depended on Middle Eastern crude oil and 
demands of Korean construction and shipbuilding services from Islamic countries 
in Asia and Africa, not to mention the Middle East (Salameh).
Korea’s new soft power therefore leads to a thorny question of the relationship 
between cultural desires among young Islamic women and Korean pop culture. 
Does Hallyu deliver a new cultural message to the Muslim youths (predominantly 
female), who yearn for cultural liberation from oppressions of all kinds? This bold 
question may sound as equivocal as the question of finding a fundamental and 
therefore universal cultural value for women that can undercut the entire Islam 
world more than Islam can. It is within the purview of this paper that the above 
question awaits an immediate answer so that we can understand a new gendered 
political discourse among female Islam Hallyu fans for their universal existence as 
free female beings vis-à-vis stereotyped Islam women portrayed in the practiced 
version of daily Quran (El Feki).
Second, we still need to go back to the old question of whether Islam is a cultural 
mandate for all human beings living in the Muslim world, including Indonesians 
(Kobayashi). Or is Islam yet another foreign culture that had so successfully invaded 
different nations culturally that local people lost the sense of its foreignness? In 
fact, this question is an old one that intrigued many colonial scholars who wrote 
about Islam and local cultures in their colonies. In Indonesia, for example, Dutch 
colonial scholar Christian Snouck Hurgronj argued that Indonesia had a “soft” 
version of Islam that was different from the mainstream tenet found in the Middle 
East (Kobayashi; Carvalho). In a similar vein, Geertz argued that the Indonesian 
cultural practice of Islam was far different from that of Morocco’s, highlighting the 
importance of local culture (“The Javanese Kijaji”; The Religion of Java). He further 
developed the concept of soft and diverse “Islamism” in Indonesia (e.g., abangan, 
santri, priyai), whereas local culture would remain homogenous (Steenbrink; 
Nakamura). Therefore, the uneasy cohabitation between Islam qua universal 
culture and local cultures as quintessentially banal variations in different Islam 
nations have continuously posed a profound theoretical question as to whether the 
embrace of Islam by localities is relative to the strength and/or peculiarity of local 
conditions. The subsequent encounters with Western colonialism, Japanese pop 
culture, and Hallyu in Islam nations, particularly in Malaysia and Indonesia, during 
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both colonial and post-colonial periods might have brought in different magnitudes 
of affection and consumption of these non-Islam (or sometimes counter-Islam) 
norms and values. Even if most Islam nations did embrace Hallyu, we still want to 
know whether the consumption pattern of Hallyu would differ from one locale to 
another.
These two seemingly unrelated questions of Islam and the voluntary embrace 
of Hallyu among the Islam youths in many different Islamic countries may cause 
confusion, although it should not be as perplexing as any other religious and cultural 
convolutions. The relativistic understanding of Islam, or any other arguments that 
emphasize the importance of local culture (e.g., Tsuchiya) continues to elide the 
devastating aspect of Islam to its selected populations, such as ethnic minorities 
(e.g., Kurds in Turkey and Iraq, black Africans in North Africa and the Middle East, 
Chinese in Malaysia and Indonesia) and women (Aguilar; Heryanto and Hadiz; 
Naramoto; Heryanto). As these writers have clearly documented and analyzed, 
Islam states, like their counterparts in secular states, have massacred, jailed, and 
physically oppressed both male and female bodies in the course of modernization 
and state building. Soldiers of the Pinochet regime committed mass rapes during 
the military coup in 1973, while President Duterte of the Philippines either jokingly 
or seriously endorses his solders’ mass rape of women in their fight against the 
Islam insurgency in Mindanao. Indonesia has not been an exception, as Suharto’s 
military coup and his regime had routinely arrested, massacred, and mass raped 
ethnic minorities and communists.
The first question of women’s desire to be free from state violence of all types is 
therefore quintessentially a question of their survival. Gender inequality and the 
oppression of and violence against women are so widespread that the importance 
of local culture is deemed meaningless—all local cultures in the Islam countries 
seem to discriminate against women. Demanding data on gender discrimination 
itself is a lame effort to cover up male domination in these countries. Having said 
that, however, we still notice that local cultures affect the patterns and magnitudes 
of Hallyu consumption, although the cultural consequence of the consumption as 
such (i.e., desire to travel Korea, desire to consume more Korean pop culture content, 
or desire to be free as women) for the young women would not vary significantly 
between Indonesia and any other Islam countries as this study indicates.
A key mechanism in the understanding of the uneasy cohabitation between 
the universal gender strife under Islam and local culture is the magnitude of state 
violence on the minority groups. It may as well be more logical to assume that 
local cultures affect the structure of tolerance, equality, and the use/avoidance 
of state violence on its own people within each Islamic society than to shoulder 
that local culture has no effect on tolerance. In other words, gender oppression is 
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universal, whereas state violence is not. For example, police violence in America 
appears appalling to U.K. citizens, who are accustomed to unarmed constables. 
One can easily assume that any challenge to Islam (e.g., demanding new gender 
relations) would automatically invite the use of state violence on women. This 
probably was why Geertz once noticed that local culture was homogenous in 
Indonesia, even though it is not, given the large number of the oppressed Chinese 
and non-Javanese people (The Religion of Java). One can also explain the same 
phenomenon differently. The state violence was too intimidating to diverse ethnic 
groups to maintain and display their own cultural hybridity. However, as this paper 
intends to demonstrate, the magnitude of state violence again depends on local 
culture, as Indonesia seems much more tolerant to cultural diversity than Morocco, 
for example (Geertz, Islam Observed).
This paper premises that Islam has not been strictly institutionalized in Indonesia, 
resulting in the relative strength of local culture. This also augurs that resistance to 
Islam and the embrace of competing cultures would have been easier for average 
Indonesians than others in the same Islam culture zone due to strong local culture. 
Finally, this leads to a possible hypothesis that the Indonesian state had to resort to 
violence more harshly and more often than its counterparts in the same Islam zone 
to solidify Islam, because its population has remained more culturally boisterous 
(i.e., more conscious about the foreignness of Islam itself vis-à-vis local and ethnic 
cultures) than other Islamic populations. This paper intends to detect differences 
in Hallyu fandom in Indonesia from its counterparts in the same Islamic culture 
zone to corroborate the hypothesis that the strength of local culture vis-à-vis Islam 
may lead to the clue to explaining such differences. In Indonesia, like others in 
the rest of the world, the most ardent Hallyu fans are young women, although 
Indonesia seems much more widespread and diverse in fandom composition than 
other Islamic countries as Palestine.
This paper first explains in detail the gender divide and its impact on Hallyu 
soft power, followed by a short analysis of local cultural variations in Indonesia 
and Palestine to measure the differences of Hallyu soft power in the two regions. 
The soft power case clearly illustrates the existence of the gender divide in Hallyu 
consumption. The paper then focuses on the role of state violence in explaining 
different magnitudes of Hallyu consumption in Indonesia with a comparative 
case of Palestine. Finally, I discuss potential threats to Hallyu soft power in Islam 
nations: a possible state violence on the consumers of Hallyu. This paper heavily 
utilizes the interviews with various Hallyu supporters in Indonesia (and Palestine 
in a smaller scale), which took place throughout 2013 and 2016. A qualitative study 
of Indonesian Hallyu fans focuses on their gender and ethnic concerns in the 
world’s largest Islamic society, while I simultaneously measure differing degrees of 
personal assessment about state violence against and suppression of women and 
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ethnic minorities (e.g., Chinese), which I believe are connected to both gender and 
ethnic variables. The paper concludes with a short discussion of Hallyu soft power 
in Indonesia.
HALLYU SOFT POWER AND THE GENDER/ETHNICITY DIVIDE
It is not totally true that the Korean government has not tried to use its culture 
to influence other nationalities through what many call the soft power public 
diplomacy. However, the Korean soft power public diplomacy failed to notice the 
linkage between soft power and the gender divide. Accordingly, Korean public 
diplomacy has produced mixed results throughout the Roh and Lee administrations, 
even as the main thrust of Korea’s public diplomacy drive tried to foster a new and 
positive national brand among Westerners (including the Japanese) for a country 
that had been dubbed by many in the West and Japan as a corrupt and dictatorial 
country.
A typical misconception among students of soft power is that branding a new 
national image is similar to branding commodities. While commodities are branded 
based on what they promise to deliver through elocutionary acts in the mass media, 
national images are dispensed based on what states actually do, rather than what 
they say (Anholt). To Japanese elites, for example, what the Korean government 
promises to do (e.g., to foster friendship with Japan for future generations) and what 
they actually do (e.g., the presidential visit to Dokdo Island) are very contradictory 
to each other. Therefore, the recent BBC poll reveals that the countries that showed 
enormous affection and support toward Korea were not Western countries or Japan, 
but Indonesia, Chile, Ghana, Nigeria, and other developing countries. Korea even 
ranked behind China in terms of national branding (BBC World Service). These 
developing nations embrace Korean soft power more than Western nations and 
Japan, because the former admire Korea’s actual track record of development and 
democratization, which may not seem as impressive to Westerners or the Japanese 
as they are to other developing countries.
Part of the reason for the failure to boost the Korean national brand among 
mainstream Western nations is the Korean government’s heavy reliance on elite-
centered branding efforts (Hall and Smith). Instead of targeting the public of 
Western nations and Japan (i.e., public diplomacy), the Korean branding programs 
approached opinion leaders of Western and Japanese societies, including foreign 
students, to help promote Korea in their own countries. However, opinion leaders 
and students do not necessarily represent the entire public of their nations. Although 
Western and Japanese elites can be co-opted in the Korean branding campaign, 
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they would not necessarily deliver pro-Korea messages to their mainstream mass 
media in their own countries, contrary to the wish of the Korean government. 
For example, Prime Minister Abe Shinzō gave a strong pro-Korea speech and 
promised to work for the betterment of Korea-Japan relations during the conferral 
ceremony of his honorary Ph.D. degree at Woosong University in Korea in 2008. 
His wife, Akie, a once fervent Hallyu fan, also visited the university routinely before 
the inauguration of the second Abe cabinet. However, he is now an avid supporter 
of ultranationalism in Japan. In fact, despite all these public relations stunts, the 
overall Japanese perception of Korea remains very negative (Hwang). Furthermore, 
students can always reinforce their nationalistic penchant even after a long period of 
education in Korea. The largest group of foreign students in Korea has consistently 
been the Chinese since the diplomatic normalization between the two countries 
in 1992. However, the Chinese perception of Korea has actually deteriorated over 
the years (Gries et al.; Hall and Smith), culminating into the current Thad fiasco 
between the two nations.
The soft power diplomacy made a slight turn from the elite-student focused efforts 
to Hallyu-centered strategies in 2009 when the Lee administration established the 
Presidential Council on Nation Branding (PCNB). This approach enthusiastically 
utilized and dispatched K-pop idols and boy/girl bands to Europe, North America, 
and other parts of the world with substantial government support in terms of 
human resources, foreign services, and financial assistance. However, the PCNB-
led Hallyu also failed to realize an important fact that only the subculture groups in 
the West and Asia did massively consume Hallyu, not the mainstream elite groups. 
In addition, the Lee administration’s K-culture policy, which encompassed both 
modern and pre-modern Korean culture, wrongly included Korean food, hoping 
to market it globally in a similar fashion to the Japanese sushi and Thai food that 
had conquered the world (Elfving-Hwang). The disastrous outcome of the Korean 
food campaign during the K-pop and K-drama peak, was a well-known tragic saga 
in Korea, which cost the government more than 23.6 billion won (or $23.6 million) 
in less than two years between 2010 and 2011 (Hall).
The government-led public or cultural diplomacy was based on two noticeable 
assumptions that were nothing but untrue. First, the Lee administration, following 
the advice of misinformed consultants, naively accepted an incorrect view that 
Korea was a “middle power” country, a concept that became popular in Korea due 
to Andrew Cooper’s seminal work (Cooper et al.). Proponents of middle power 
diplomacy argued that Korea was a middle power country preordained by its 
economic, military, and population size (Sohn). This is a gross underestimation of 
Korea, given the astounding fact that it is one of the seven countries in the world 
that passed the test of $20,000 per capita GDP with a population of 50 million 
(the 20-50 club) by 2012. In addition, Korea became the 24th member of the 
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prestigious Development Assistance Committee (DAC) club of the OECD in 2009. 
Therefore, contrary to middle power theory which overlaps the belief that Korea 
can be as attractive as Canada, Switzerland, or Australia, the Korean soft power 
diplomacy might be deemed imperialistic to the elites and ordinary people in many 
developing countries, especially in China and Southeast Asia, if Korea pursued a 
fervent cultural diplomacy in a fashion similar to Japan’s soft power policy during 
the 1980s (Huang).
Second, the middle power theory fails to distinguish mainstream culture from 
that of subculture as a tool of middle power public diplomacy. As I have mentioned 
earlier, Hallyu is a subcultural phenomenon in the Middle East and many other 
countries in the world, as the majority Hallyu supporters are women and/or 
ethnic minorities. In the case of Japan, for example, the gender divide in Hallyu 
consumption and its impact on Korean national branding is too clear to deny (see 
Tables 1 and 2).
Table 1: Demographic Composition of Hallyu Consumption in Japan
Gender Age
Buying Pattern Male Female 20s 30s 40s 50s 60s
Rarely consume 34.4% 21.9 29.8 33.8 25 21.7 26
Sometimes 52.1 50.6 56.2 55 51.4 44.6 46.6
Frequently 13.5 27.4 14 11.3 23.6 33.7 27.4
Total 192/100 237/99.9 121/100 80/100 72/100 83/100 73/100
Source: Han (170)
Table 2: Perception Changes among Japanese before and after Hallyu Boom
Before Hallyu Boom After Hallyu Boom
Scale 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Male 1.5% 9.2 4.4 6.7 0.3 0.2 5.1 0.3 4.3 5.1
Female 3.1 1.1 1.8 5.2 0.9 0.1 0.8 6.2 7.6 7.4
Note: On this scale, 1 means the worst and 5 means the best perception of Korea by the Japanese.
Source: Modified from Han (188).
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As Table 1 shows, the number of female supporters who frequently consume 
Hallyu in Japan is twice the number of male supporters. Furthermore, it is 
discernible from the same table that women in the age bracket of 40s to 60s are 
the main consumers of Hallyu. Therefore, if the Korean government promoted 
Hallyu soft power diplomacy in Japan and elsewhere by targeting the mainstream 
population (i.e., male and elite women), it would only exacerbate the problem with 
Korean national branding, eventually fanning and fueling the anti-Hallyu protests.
Table 2 also confirms the fact that it was the women who showed the largest drop 
among the respondents who had the worst perception of Korea after their exposure 
to Hallyu (i.e., from 3.1% to 0.1%), while it was also the women who exhibited the 
largest increase in the bracket of respondents who had the best perception of 
Korea after their Hallyu experience (i.e., from 0.9% to 7.4%). Therefore, the middle 
power theory that wrongly placed Korea in the global middle power group and 
hence recommended elite or student based soft power cultural diplomacy in China, 
Japan, Europe, Oceania, and North America brought in unintended consequences, 
especially in the form of anti-Hallyu movements of varying degrees in Japan, China, 
Vietnam, Malaysia, and other countries. However, Indonesia, Chile, Ghana, and 
Nigeria, where their publics had not experienced the Korean government’s Hallyu 
soft power diplomacy directly, ironically flaunted increasing attraction to Korea 
and its culture. In this sense, anti-Hallyu movements in Japan and China are direct 
indications of how state violence and/or state sponsored violence against a foreign 
culture and its consumers can destroy cultural waves of all sorts.
Having explained why Hallyu soft power as a public diplomacy pitch during the 
two administrations preceding the impeached Park administration has produced 
unintended consequences by neglecting gender/ethnic divides, we now analyze 
Hallyu soft power in Indonesia with a comparative case in Palestine.
HALLYU IN ISLAM NATIONS
Indonesia and Palestine are two important Islamic nations despite their vast 
differences in political economic structures, culture, languages, and geographical 
locations. Indonesia is the largest Islam country in the world with a population size 
of 252.8 million, whereas Palestine is barely an independent state with only regional 
self-rule without full UN representation as a recognized member state (Naramoto). 
Despite wide differences in state institutions, local culture, and geographical 
locations, these two nations have formed grass roots Hallyu movement among 
young women in both urban and rural areas. As Table 3 indicates, the number 
of Hallyu fan clubs and their registered members in major Islamic countries in 
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the world have continuously and increasingly expanded from 2014 without Korean 
public diplomacy in the region, indicating their widened consumption bases of 
Hallyu ranging from Korean TV dramas, Korean fashion, Korean food, and to 
K-pop (Kim et al.; Otmazgin and Lyan). Given the strict gender segregation in 
social relations, most club members in the Islam countries are female only, except 
in Indonesia due to a huge number of Hallyu fans who are Chinese.
Table 3: Total Hallyu Club Members in Islam Nations
2014 2015 2016
Egypt 59,938 109,533 128,288 
Tunisia 13,700 13,700 14,500 
Algeria 306 13,442 12,146 
Morocco 4,040 4,040 12,050 
Jordan 4,825 4,825 10,681 
UAE 1,915 4,362 3,612 
Iraq 1,285 1,285 1,285 
Kuwait 360 360 500 
Saudi Arabia 43 43 0 
Indonesia 232,798 663,062 853,728 
Source: Korea Foundation (2014–2016)
The similarities amidst vast differences of the two countries are not limited to 
the recent Hallyu phenomenon. Indeed, both Indonesia and Palestine have been 
subject to foreign cultural invasions throughout their long history. Islam was a 
fundamentally foreign culture to both nations, as Arab countries through political, 
economic, and military means forcibly or semi-forcibly introduced the religion. 
Simultaneously, Islam was a fundamental ideological basis with which to fight 
Western imperialism that destroyed the Islam political structure of the two nations. 
Postcolonial experiences in these two countries were also similar, in that Palestine 
had to suffer from the militarist occupation of their land by the immigrant Jews, 
while Indonesia had to suffer from military coups d’état and state violence against the 
Chinese, Marxists, and other ethnic minorities (Naramoto; Heryanto). The reason 
these two nations were subject to foreign invasions and continuous conflicts with 
foreign cultures and migrants is their geopolitical location that connects between 
cultural and economic centers (the Roman Empire, the Arab Empires, the Osman 
Empire, the Chinese Empire) and natural and agrarian resources (gold, silver, silk, 
Oh / Islam and Local Culture 242
Kritika Kultura 29 (2017): –257 © Ateneo de Manila University
<http://journals.ateneo.edu/ojs/kk/>
tea, pepper, gum, etc.). This means that both Palestine and Java were cultural, 
economic, and trade centers of the region that was further connected to the long-
distance trade in the pre-modern and modern era. It is therefore not surprising that 
both Palestine and Java were wealthy cosmopolitan societies with significant levels 
of tolerance to foreign cultures (Boxer; Andaya; Doumani; Hirosue; Naramoto).
The historical background of Palestine and Java provides us with an initial clue 
to why both Islam countries with colossal geographical and cultural differences 
have produced a Hallyu subculture among their young women. This linkage 
between regional history and Hallyu augurs a new theoretical hypothesis that the 
issue of gender has been neglected in the study of the conflict between Islam and 
local culture on the one hand and local culture and imported culture on the other. 
Hallyu to them is a new foreign cultural product that is in full competition with 
the previous ones in the local pop culture market. Therefore, a comparative study 
of Palestine and Indonesia provides us with clues to the role of the gender divide 
in different societies in the world in Hallyu consumption and soft power, while 
Islam and other foreign cultures are controlled historically and geographically. 
At the same time, the comparison of Indonesia and Palestine would also reveal a 
Fig. 1. Comparative Framework of Islam Hallyu
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neglected mechanism of state violence on imported cultures and their consumers 
in Islam societies.
These two cases shed light on both similarities (i.e., Islam, young women, ethnic 
compositions) and dissimilarities (local culture, tolerance to foreign culture, state 
violence) of Hallyu subculture movements in each case. Through this similarity-
dissimilarity comparative analysis, I want to find out whether gender-ethnic divides 
are real in these two countries as a single most important facilitator of accepting 
Hallyu as a new cultural symbol of liberation from internal oppressions. I also 
want to know whether dissimilarity factors of local culture, tolerance, and state 
violence can explain the differences in Hallyu soft power perceptions and Hallyu 
consumptions in Indonesia and Palestine.
Both Indonesia and Palestine are multiethnic societies. Palestinians comprise 
a political minority group within the state of Israel, which in and of itself is 
a multicultural and multiethnic society composed of various groups of Jews, 
Arabs, and Bedouins (these terms refer to cultural, not biological, ethnicity). In 
Indonesia, the Javanese control of other ethnic minorities in the island nation, such 
as Sumatrans and the Chinese, has been the norm (Samson; Suryadinata; Lev). 
Palestinians are to Jews what Chinese are to the Javanese. Mainstream Jews uphold 
Judaic religious values, whereas the majority of Palestinians are Muslims. The 
situation is the opposite in Indonesia, where Muslims are the mainstream vis-à-vis 
the Chinese who practice either Chinese Confucianism or Christianity. Therefore, 
as Table 4 shows, both Palestinian and Chinese women face double discrimination 
qua the second sex and Muslims/Chinese in their society, whereas Javanese and 
Jewish women face only gender discriminations.
Various empirical studies indicate that young women in Indonesia and Palestine 
form the majority of Hallyu fans (Kim et al.; KOFICE; Otmazgin and Lyan), although 
in Japan it is the middle-aged women, as we have already explained above. This 
difference between Japan and Islam nations is due to their dissimilar motivations 
toward learning foreign cultures (Oh, “Hallyu”, “Torn Between”).3 In recent 
Indonesian fandom surveys, both Chinese and Javanese young women have formed 
a strong Hallyu fandom base throughout Java, whereas male and older generation 
Muslim populations have not formed similar fandom for the Korean subculture 
(KOFICE). Similarly, in recent Israeli fandom surveys, we can find comparable 
data that indicates a relatively strong Hallyu fandom base among young Israeli and 
Palestinian women in their high teens and early twenties (KOFICE; Otmazgin and 
Lyan). It is also found by the surveys of various years that the fandom base among 
the Islam populations in Indonesia and Palestine, and non-Islam populations in 
Israel and Indonesia have been expanding continuously since the 2010s, even 
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though strong anti-Hallyu or anti-Korean sentiments are rapidly spreading in 
China, Japan, and other countries in Southeast Asia (Huang; Hwang).
Therefore, a universal truth of the gender divide in the spread of Hallyu can be 
confirmed in Israel/Palestine and Indonesia. What is interesting is the ethnic divide 
within the female fans of Hallyu in Israel/Palestine and Indonesia is unusually 
striking despite the fact that they are victims of sexism in their own male-dominated 
society. As Table 4 shows, ethnic segregation within the Hallyu fan groups in each 
region is evident despite the fact that gender discrimination is as universal as the 
gender divide in Hallyu fandom. In various interviews, I could confirm that ethnic 
animosity between female Israeli and Palestinian Hallyu fans was strong, although 
such hatred is much diluted between female Chinese and Javanese Hallyu fans.
Ethnic segregation is manifested by state violence on minority women for 
their cultural consumption patterns. As Table 4 shows, state violence on Chinese 
women for defying Islam on the one hand and embracing Western and/or Chinese 
culture is most obvious, although the Israeli government in Palestine also harshly 
suppresses the fundamentalist Islamic movement (both male and females). What 
is striking in our analysis of the four groups of female Hallyu fans in Indonesia and 
Israel/Palestine is that it is the Islamic women in both countries that are the most 
ardent followers of Hallyu phenomenon. There has not yet been any state violence 
reported on the Islamic women who consume Hallyu in large quantities in each 
country. Furthermore, it is the Indonesian Muslim women who are the strongest 
and most loyal fans of Hallyu (i.e., the sheer number of club members in Indonesia 
vis-à-vis other Islam nations).
Table 4: Women’s Status in Four Ethnic Communities
Jewish 
Women
Palestinian 
Women
Javanese 
Women
Chinese 
Women in 
Indonesia
Discrimination against
National Level Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ghetto level N/A Yes N/A Yes
Tolerance to
Consuming Western/
Japanese Yes Partially Partially Yes
Islam Partially Yes Yes Yes/No*
Hallyu Yes Partially Partially Partially
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Jewish 
Women
Palestinian 
Women
Javanese 
Women
Chinese 
Women in 
Indonesia
State violence on
Consuming Western/
Japanese No Partially Partially No
Islam Partially No No No
Hallyu No Not yet Not yet Not yet
Local culture among Strong Weak Strong Medium
Hallyu soft power among Medium Medium High High
*Muslims force Islam on Chinese women, whereas Chinese men would not tolerate Chinese 
women voluntarily becoming Muslims.
Does this mean that Islam, Indonesian regional culture, and the type of state 
violence are three significant factors that define female Hallyu fandom in Islam 
societies, as mature age and Japanese local culture were the key factors among East 
Asian female Hallyu fans? Islam in Palestine and Indonesia is a religious symbol that 
represents both suppression and liberation. When the Osman Empire occupied 
Palestine, Islam was a symbol of suppression, although it suddenly turned into a 
message of liberation when the new Arab nationalism started its political campaign 
in the region after the Second World War (Naramoto). Likewise, Islam was a 
message of suppression and invasion to Indonesia during the 17th century, while it 
worked as a symbol of liberation during the independence movement in alliance 
with Japanese imperialism against the Dutch forces (Kobayashi).4 Therefore, Islam 
is not a universal but a perplexing religious symbol to Palestinians and Indonesians, 
who had to fight external invasions and internal political and ethnic divisions and 
strife throughout its pre-modern and modern history.
Like in Palestine, the regional culture in Indonesia was based on economic 
affluence, cultural diversity, openness, tolerance to foreign cultures, and massive 
cultural hybridity. The basis of economic affluence derived from the global trade with 
long distance merchants from China, Japan, other Southeast Asian countries, India, 
Arab countries, and even Portugal (Boxer; Andaya). To deal with global commercial 
trade efficiently, Indonesian rulers in the port cities hired port and trade specialists 
who migrated into Indonesia from Europe, China, and India. Cosmopolitanism 
and cultural openness to outer religions were a necessity for the global commercial 
activities, and consequently, Indonesian rulers had openly embraced Buddhism, 
Hinduism, Confucianism, Islam, and even Christianity until the Portuguese and 
Dutch invasions (Hirosue). Cultural hybridity, instead of cultural universalism, was 
the cultural structure of Islam for Indonesians, whether they were state officials 
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or peasants. Be that as it may, hybridized local culture coexisted with the state 
ideology of Islam that quickly institutionalized and localized the Arabian religious 
rituals through intellectual and professional communications with Arab religious 
leaders and scholars (Kobayashi). The subsequent colonial influences from Western 
Christianity and Japanese elite culture only augmented the diversity of local culture 
in Indonesia without destroying the fundamental institutional bifurcation between 
Islam as state ideology or high culture and local culture as subculture.
The Indonesian type of institutional bifurcation was lacking in Palestine, where 
Islam became both high culture and subculture in the absence of the Palestinian 
state. After the withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire, as the first Islam state that 
occupied Palestine based on the suppression of local culture, Palestinians 
recovered their ethnic identity as Arabs through the rediscovery of Islam as their 
own religion. Previously, Palestinians had freedom of choosing Islam, Judaism, 
or Christianity in their own territory, a geographic space that had always been in 
contention among various external powers. Similar to Indonesia, Palestinians had 
to accept foreign religions as a means of survival. However, unlike Indonesia, Islam 
and its sacred Arabic language were not in conflict with local culture, creating 
no institutional bifurcation between Islam as a state ideology and local culture 
as subculture (Naramoto). Therefore, as the independence movement raged on 
during the early 20th century, most Palestinians were converted to Islam. This 
difference is significant to the extent that it can explain why Indonesia is not only 
different from other Muslim countries in the Middle East and North Africa, but 
more ardent than any other Islamic countries in their open consumption of Hallyu 
among local young women.
A further difference between Indonesia and Palestine is noticeable in the role 
of Islam as a state ideology. Apart from the fact that Palestine is still in the process 
of recovering its state from invaders and occupiers, Indonesia’s Islam as a state 
ideology was mobilized not only during its resistance to Western imperialism 
in its process of building a new state, but harshly applied to the suppression and 
massacres of its own people during the state-building process, especially against 
Indonesian Marxists and Chinese immigrants (Aguilar; Heryanto). First and 
foremost, the Indonesian state builders worked closely with Japanese imperialists 
in their efforts to eradicate Dutch imperialists, creating an internal cleavage within 
the military over ideological issues. The military faction led by Sukarno was pro-
Japan in a similar fashion to Subhas Chandra Bose, who worked closely with Nazi 
Germany and imperial Japan in his fight against the British. The ousting of Sukarno 
by Suharto was an attempt by a competing military faction to wipe out pro-Japanese 
Marxists from the new nation. Suharto’s state violence on Marxist Indonesians (or 
anyone he labeled as Marxists) and the Chinese Indonesians, which were carried 
out mostly by Muslim paramilitary groups, was an attempt by the state to impose 
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pure Islam on all Indonesians, even though Islam was not an Indonesian indigenous 
culture (Mietzner).
State violence on its own people during the modern state building has not 
existed in Palestine, a very significant deviation from the Indonesian phenomenon, 
although Palestine can also stage collective violence against particular foreign 
cultures in a similar fashion to Japan’s anti-Hallyu movements. In this sense, both 
Indonesian Islam and local culture deviate substantially from those of Palestine and 
the Arab world. Outstanding Indonesian Islam and local culture may explain the 
highest Hallyu soft power in that country (see Table 3). The key to this Indonesian 
idiosyncrasy derives from its use of state violence on its own people in order to 
preserve its Islam high culture vis-à-vis its strong local culture (see Table 5). This 
idiosyncrasy disappeared in a relatively short period after ousting Suharto from 
the military government. With the withdrawal of the state violence supported 
by Islam, Indonesian youths are ardently showing their desire for liberation and 
freedom by massively consuming foreign culture, including Hallyu. However, it 
is very unclear, just like the uncertain future of Indonesian democracy, whether 
the new democratic Islam state would reinstate state terror on young Hallyu fans 
in the country, who seem very intimidating to the state ideology of Islamic purity, 
especially among Indonesian women, whether Javanese, Sumatran, or Chinese.
Table 5: State Violence on Foreign Cultures in Indonesia and Palestine
 Country Indigenous Culture Islam
Western/ 
Christian Marxism
Japanese 
Pop Culture Hallyu
Supporters
Indonesia All Male, ruling Chinese Male, Urban, Educated Young
Female,
Young
Palestine None All Rare Male, Urban, Educated
Female, 
Young
Female,
Young
State 
Violence
Indonesia None On ISIS On Chinese Yes None Not Yet
Palestine N/A On Hamas On Jews None Not Yet Not Yet
Conse­
quence
Indonesia Openness Unification Colonialism Persecution & Dictatorship
Asian 
diversity
State violence 
on Hallyu 
imminent?
Palestine Closedness Intifada Colonialism PLO factions (Darwish) Globalization
No immediate 
sanctions?
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However, whether in Indonesia or Palestine, Islam in general works as a 
hidden force behind the gender divide (Moghadam; Mir-Hosseini; Douki et al. 
2007). Despite democracy and the withdrawal of the Islamic military state, Islam 
in Indonesia reappeared as a politically neutral national religion that mobilizes 
the Javanese toward the suppression of non-Islamic ethnic groups in the country. 
Islam and the craving for feminine freedom are therefore reversely related, as much 
as Islam is positively related to political dictatorship and gender inequality. Hallyu 
therefore is a message of hope for the young Islam women in both Palestine and 
Indonesia, as much as it was a message of melancholia for older Japanese Hallyu 
fans (Oh, “Torn Between”). While Islam has changed its faces over various historical 
periods in the two countries, what remained unchanged was women’s status under 
Islam.
HALLYU AND ISLAM STATES – INTERVIEW RESULTS
The interviews took place in Jakarta and Surabaya, Indonesia in 2013 and 2016, 
respectively. Most interviewees were female Hallyu fans aged 18 to 40 with a small 
number of male Hallyu fans (a total of 30 interviewees). The Palestine interviews 
took place in 2014 with female Hallyu fans only who were mostly college students 
(aged between 16 and 20) in the West Bank (a total of 10 interviewees). By virtue 
of “global focused interviews and ethnographic revisits” from 2013 to 2016 (and 
thus rejecting “car window sociology” with only one or two distant visits without 
engaging actively with the daily lives of the interviewees), I generated reflexive 
global ethnographic data either to refute the extant interpretations of the female 
and/or minority Hallyu fans in Indonesia and Palestine or to reconstruct their 
minority or gender strife through new theoretical perspectives (see inter alia, Du 
Bois; Merton et al.; Colson et al.; Geertz, After the Fact; Burawoy,  “Introduction,” 
“Revisits”).
The interview results with Indonesian and Palestine Hallyu fans support our 
discussions so far. First and foremost, Indonesian female Hallyu fans love Hallyu 
because of their strong desire to have more choices over their cultural consumption 
besides Islam, Chinese, Western, and Japanese mainstream or subculture products. 
In this regard, most of them feel that Hallyu gives them more pleasure than the 
competing cultural content from other countries.
My interest in K-pop was raised because they offer what is not provided by other 
pop music, such as Indonesian or American. The K-pop industry “sells” its artists wholly 
to fulfill the dreams of their fans. In their stage appearance, K-pop boy bands and girl 
bands can offer a different package (in the dancing and costume) compared to British 
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or American bands. The agencies satisfy the whims of the fans, by holding fan meetings, 
which are not limited to talk shows, but also complemented with fans getting signatures, 
handshakes, high fives and even hugs from their idols. These are intended, in my opinion, 
to bring the artists closer to their fans. K-pop is also sold in various forms of merchandise. 
In short, the K-pop industry fulfills the dream, but also creates such a dream, among its 
fans. (Interview with Furi, a female Javanese Islam woman in her mid-20s)
It is easy to tell the difference between K-pop and other pop music because K-pop is 
more refreshing and joyful, especially during their concerts. […] K-pop touches my heart 
directly and it’s full of emotions. (Minas, a female Palestinian college student, 20)
Particularly interesting is how these female Hallyu fans in Indonesia and Palestine 
perceive Korea and Korean women as equally beautiful and want to emulate them 
(i.e., want to be as pretty and free as Korean women).
I follow my idols news, and I also enjoy seeing the very beautiful natural views of 
Korea. (Minas) I want to be as pretty as Korean women even if that entails a cosmetic 
surgery. (Ilona, a Chinese Indonesian Christian female college student) I liked their 
beauty in everything. They give me hope to have a better future. (Ibtihal, a Palestinian 
college female)
While not much cultural diversity is found in Palestine, where Islam is the same 
as local culture, Indonesians consider their ethnic or local culture to be different 
from Islam.
Korean culture has a lot of values that Islam would also appreciate, such as respecting 
between people, justice, honoring one’s parents. Islam would also appreciate family 
values. There are a lot of things in Korean culture that are considered precious in Islam. 
(Maysa, a Palestinian college female)
Maysa finds some aspects of Korean culture to be similar to Islam, although 
her big premise is that the universal Islam value system is above the particularistic 
Korean counterpart.
Instead of antagonizing other cultures, Islam in fact calls for knowing other cultures 
and mixing with them. As Allah said, “Oh mankind, we created you from a single (pair) 
of a male and female, and we made you into nations and tribes, that you may know 
each other (not that you may despise each other).” But in that purview, Islam limits this 
mixing by taking only the useful things from the culture and the things that match with 
Islam. You should reject what goes against Islam and its values. There are some sides 
of Hallyu that Islam forbids such as singing and dancing and the intense relationships 
between the two genders. (Maysa)
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However, among Indonesian Hallyu fans, Korean culture represents different 
aspects of their diverse ethnic and local cultures.
Korean culture that emphasizes politeness is similar to Indonesian. Koreans also add 
emphases to keeping manners, good behavior, and not expressing emotions explicitly. 
These are all commonly found in our culture. (Desideria, a female Christian Javanese 
Ph.D. student)
Tough women that appear on most Korean dramas are similar to our cultural values. 
(Ruth, a female Karo Batak college student in Jakarta) The value of working hard is found 
in both cultures. Also, family ties are strong. (Vicky, a Chinese-Javanese female college 
student)
Although Desideria, a Christian Javanese woman, judges Korean culture based on 
her local Islam culture, Ruth, who is a Karo Batak woman, views female “toughness” 
as an important Korean value, whereas Vicky, who is a Chinese-Javanese woman, 
highlights Chinese work ethic commonly found in Korean culture. Therefore, the 
diversity of local culture allows these Indonesian fans to be more assertive and 
open to foreign cultures than Palestinian women by exploring cultural similarities 
found in foreign cultures through their own local and ethnic values. Fundamentally, 
the openness of Indonesian local culture, despite Islam, allows young female Hallyu 
fans to travel Korea freely, whereas such freedom does not exist in Palestine, where 
women must travel with their fathers or husbands.
However, Hallyu gives messages of hope to both Indonesian and Palestine 
female fans. The gender divide in Hallyu consumption leads these young female 
fans to “forward learning” in the hope of overcoming their gendered melancholia, 
which is one type of relative deprivation (Butler; Oh, “Torn Between”). For example, 
Palestinian female Hallyu fans emphasize their desire to escape from Palestine and 
pursue a new dream of visiting and living in Korea. To them Korea is a seemingly 
inaccessible destination of an imagined trip, a country that they think is closer 
to their dreamland than their Palestinian homeland that is devastated and 
unavoidable. Korea to them is also different from their previously held dreamlands 
such as neighboring oil rich Arab nations, Europe, or even America. For example, a 
seventeen-year-old girl from Nablus said: “My only dream is to visit Korea and try 
everything I wanted to try there.”
My Korean knowledge will help me get scholarship to KAIST. I want to learn 
advanced technological knowledge in Korea and eventually get a job in Indonesia that 
involves work with Korea. (Rahman, a Javanese Muslim college male)
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Table 6: Local Culture, Islam, and State Violence
Indonesia Palestine
Gender 
factor
Why love 
Hallyu?
-Korean women are so beautiful 
-Korea is so beautiful 
-Korea is advanced and creative 
-Korea has all the family values 
that cannot be found in 
Indonesia
-Korean women are so pretty 
-Korea is so advanced and 
beautiful 
-Korea has good traditional 
values similar to Islam culture
Local 
culture vs. 
Islam
What if 
Islam 
contradicts 
to Hallyu?
-Not much contradiction 
between Indonesian culture 
and Hallyu 
-Some religious values 
discourage Hallyu, but not 
really controversial even if 
we disobeyed some of the 
religious values
-Cannot freely travel Korea 
without fathers’ consent 
-Cannot accept active intersex 
relations shown on K-pop and 
K-drama 
-Remain conforming to Islam 
values that contradict to Hallyu
Views 
of state 
violence
Fear of 
state 
violence on 
Hallyu fans?
-Given former dictatorship and 
rising Islamic fundamentalism 
in the government, we fear 
state violence on Hallyu fans
-No reason to fear state violence 
as Islam appreciates learning 
from other cultures
For Indonesians, studying in Korea comes with a specific plan that can be 
achievable, unlike the dismal Palestinian dreams held by the fans there. Also, some 
of the Indonesian fans have already deepened their understanding of Korea by 
visiting the country over and again.
First, you like K-pop and drama, but as you go deeper, you will like Korean places and 
travel destinations. They’re different from Indonesia; it has four seasons, pretty flowers, 
and different eco systems. The Korean government takes a good care of tour spots. Also, 
you get to love Korean food, which is unique and mostly delicious like BBQ beef. Korea 
is more unique than Japan, because it has North-South conflicts that separated families 
into North and South. They can meet together only when they get really old. It’s all sad. 
(Gladys, a Chinese Christian college female)
Strong commitment to Islam vis-à-vis local culture as a state ideology of 
liberation and independence from Western imperialism and Israel allows Palestine 
Hallyu fans to be free from the paranoia of state violence on them as punishment for 
violating some of the Islamic fundamentals. However, Islam as a state ideology to 
purge foreign cultures, especially Western Christianity and Chinese ethnic culture, 
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continues to be a source of menace among female Hallyu fans, especially Chinese 
Hallyu fans, who do not deny their fear of state violence on them in the near future.
Why would the Palestinian government punish Hallyu fans? It would never punish 
the Hallyu fans. I mean why would it do so? It has no right to do so. Our love for Hallyu 
belongs to us and no one has anything to do with it. (Maysa)
I fear the Indonesian government might do something to us. That also depends on 
how well Koreans polish their pop culture not to anger Muslims in my country. For 
example, I heard that there is one K-pop singer who wears hijab. Maybe, she can be a 
spokesperson or an ambassador between K-pop and Islam. Just prepare a pray room 
for Muslims during K-pop concerts or cultural events. Koreans need to be cautious to 
make the whole process smooth and peaceful. (Xena, a Christian Chinese female in the 
mid-20s)
CONCLUSION
State violence against particular cultures of foreign origin or groups of 
immigrants who hold foreign cultural values has been common in pre-modern and 
modern human history (Tilly, The Politics, “Terror”; Lie). However, violence against 
the female population for consuming unacceptable foreign cultures or mating 
with foreign males has not been widely noticed or studied historically (Watts and 
Zimmerman). Hallyu is a new global cultural phenomenon that is based on the 
gender divide and therefore is a potential target of state and social violence. On 
top of these important developments surrounding the Hallyu phenomenon, the 
Korean government has tried to promote Hallyu as a new Korean soft power based 
on wrong information and understanding of the new pop culture phenomenon, 
further exacerbating the anti-Hallyu sentiments among elite and male groups in 
various societies where Hallyu is popular.
In this paper, I tried to chart out the basic structure of the Hallyu phenomenon 
in two widely different Islam societies of Palestine and Indonesia, focusing on the 
gender divide and state violence as two key concepts of this study. Although both 
Indonesia and Palestine embraced Hallyu as a new foreign cultural import in their 
cultural market that has already been inundated with Islam, Western, and Japanese 
cultural icons and products, the two countries present widely different patterns of 
Hallyu fandom. While Indonesia is the largest Islam nation in the world that has 
the largest female Hallyu fans in Southeast Asia, Palestine is the smallest Islam 
internal colony within the state of Israel with the smallest number of female Hallyu 
fans. Although strong Indonesian local culture and ethnic diversity allowed the 
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creation of quick and large fandom, it has also ignited internal worries among male 
Islamic groups of the nation who want to curtail female Hallyu fandom in their 
country to protect Islamic fundamentals.
This is why we need to look at both Islam and local culture in the analysis of the 
gender divide in global cultural hybridity. Islam in Indonesia means oppression 
by the male rulers who proactively adopted a foreign religion from Arabia or the 
Middle East, whereas it denotes resistance against all historical forms of external 
oppression onto local people in Palestine. Islam remains an indigenous culture for 
Arab people in Palestine, whereas it is a foreign culture in Indonesia. Therefore, 
Islam in Indonesia is closely related to state violence against those who resisted 
Islam, whereas it resonates with liberation from Western and Israeli repression in 
Palestine. However, in both countries, Islam universally works as a sexist ideology 
that has suppressed women, forcing them to seek gender liberation apart from 
national liberation. Therefore, for Indonesians, Hallyu is another cultural choice 
for women who enjoy newly gained democracy and chances of realizing forward 
learning, whereas for Palestinians, Hallyu is an ultimate hope of realizing their 
suppressed expression of ressentiment. This means that in Palestine, female Hallyu 
fans cannot openly criticize Islam for their ill fate, although loving Hallyu is 
permitted without the fear of state violence. Indonesian female Hallyu fans can 
easily drop Hallyu if state violence, similar to the previous massacres of Marxists 
and Chinese, creeps in.
Islam societies present an enigma especially when local culture interacts with 
Islam. However, future cultural studies of Islam societies must continue to look 
at both poles of local culture and Islam in order to understand a complex web 
of the gender divide in the consumption of foreign cultures. State violence also 
continues to affect cultural consumption patterns in global hybrid communities, 
an important topic that needs to be pursued in the future.
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Notes
* This work was supported by the Policy-Oriented Research Grant (2016) generously 
provided by the Korea Foundation.
1. In this paper, a Muslim country or nation refers to a state where the majority 
population are Islamic believers.
2. Although learning motivations are important in determining Hallyu fandom in 
the current global world system, I will not discuss the topic in detail in this paper. 
For an in-depth analysis of Hallyu motivations, see inter alia, Oh, “Hallyu,” “Torn 
Between”; Oh and Park.
3. Although it was the Javanese themselves who openly embraced Islam or initiated 
the process of Islamization of Indonesia since the 17th century, those who needed 
Islam the most were the wealthy merchants and politicians in the court who 
controlled global trade with Arabs. The local abagan (peasants) did not accept the 
new religion until independence (see Geertz, The Religion of Java).
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